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THE SURVIVAL OF CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE: HOW DO WE STOP 
RANSOMWARE ATTACKS ON HOSPITALS? 
Helena Roland* 
In March 2018, a ransomware attack struck hospitals in Georgia, holding 
3,789 computers hostage for ten days.1 In September 2019, a ransomware attack 
cancelled numerous surgeries in Wyoming.2 Since 2019, there have been 621 
ransomware attacks on hospitals across the globe.3 Malicious software has 
silently struck the nation’s healthcare system at a dramatic pace, and there is no 
clear way to stop it. A place in which humanity seeks help and recovery is under 
attack and the attackers are not held accountable in a court of law. 
Hospitals are a critical component of the nation’s social infrastructure.4 Take 
a moment: is it possible to name a person that has not sought out medical 
treatment? Additionally, is there a time when a patient walks into a medical 
facility and is able to withhold all personal information and data? The healthcare 
industry is rapidly growing, as necessary, to meet all needs. However, as the 
industry grows, so does the opportunity to strike.5 Hospitals have access to social 
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1 Vanessa Romo, Georgia Charges Iranians in Ransomware Attack on Atlanta, NPR (Dec. 
5, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/05/673958138/georgia-charges-iranians-in-
ransomware-attack-on-atlanta. 
 2 Aimee Picchi, Ransomware’s Mounting Toll: Delayed Surgeries and School 
Closures, CBS NEWS (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ransomware-attack-
621-hospitals-cities-and-schools-hit-so-far-in-2019/. 
 3 Picchi, supra note 2. 
 4 See Ryan Nunn et al., A Dozen Facts About the Economics of the US Health-Care 
System, BROOKINGS (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-dozen-facts-
about-the-economics-of-the-u-s-health-care-system/ (noting that the United States relies 
heavily on hospitals for employment and economic infrastructure). 
 5 See generally Sylvestre Uwizeyemungu & Placide Poba-Nzaou, Security and Privacy 
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security numbers, bank account information, health records, familial 
background information, genetic information, and almost everything one would 
want to remain private in one’s life.6 Every time a patient walks into a doctor’s 
office she must either fill out a form that has all personal data or she must check 
over that sheet to ensure that the data is correct. What would happen if 
unscrupulous individuals stole that information and held it for ransom? 
This article will begin with the origins of ransomware attacks in 1989.7 Then, 
it will discuss the definition of ransomware and how the tactic has been viewed 
in the modern world.8 After defining the term, the article will turn to the 
reasoning behind hospital ransomware attacks and why a critical feature of the 
nation’s infrastructure is under attack.9 Consequently, there are practical and 
legal ramifications of ransomware attacks that must be addressed.10 Finally, this 
article will look at how ransomware attacks can be deterred through the 
American legal system, such as the adoption of a criminal theory of general 
                                                          
Practice in Healthcare Information Systems: A Cluster Analysis of European Hospitals, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND INT’L CONF. ON INFO. SYS. SEC. AND PRIVACY 1, 41–44 (2016) 
(showing that as a hospital’s reliance on technology increases, the need for secure IT 
protection increases). 
 6 See Patient Registration Forms, DOCTORS CARE, https://doctorscare.com/ 
patientforms/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2021); see also New Patient Information and Consent, 
DOCTORS CARE, https://doctorscare.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/PAT-F002A-11-19-
DC-Patient-Information-and-Consent-New-Patient.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2021) (providing 
an example of the type of information that healthcare providers require from patients, 
including birthdate, social security number, address, and employer). 
 7 Kaveh Waddell, The Computer Virus That Haunted Early AIDS Researchers: The 
First-Ever Ransomware Attack Was Delivered on a Floppy Disk, THE ATLANTIC (May 10, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/05/the-computer-virus-that-
haunted-early-aids-researchers/481965/. 
 8 Ransomware, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, https://www.us-
cert.gov/Ransomware (last visited Mar. 4, 2021). 
 9 Deborah R. Farringer, Send Us the Bitcoin or Patients Will Die: Addressing the Risks 
of Ransomware Attacks on Hospitals, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 937, 941 (2017); Hackers 
Demand $14 Million from Nursing Homes in Ransomware Attack, CBS NEWS (Nov. 25, 
2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hackers-ransomware-nursing-homes-14-million/. 
 10 See Manny Fernandez et al., Ransomware Attacks are Testing Resolve of Cities 
Across America, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/ 
us/ransomware-attacks-hacking.html; see also Michael Balsamo, 2 Iranian Hackers 
Charged in Ransomware Scheme that Targeted Maryland’s MedStar Health, BALT. SUN 
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-medstar-ransomware-
indictment-20181129-story.html; see also Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals 
for City of Atlanta Ransomware Attack, U.S. ATT’Y OFF., N.D. OF GA. (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/atlanta-us-attorney-charges-iranian-nationals-city-
atlanta-ransomware-attack. 
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deterrence,11 creation of an American tribunal for cybercrime,12 an 
implementation of cybercrime laws at local levels,13 and an increase in federal 
funding.14 This article will make it apparent that there is more the United States 
can do to prevent ransomware attacks. 
I. ORIGINS OF RANSOMWARE ATTACKS 
In 1989, the AIDS epidemic was at an all-time high: over 100,000 reported 
cases.15 In the same year, the first major ransomware threat emerged entitled 
“AIDS Trojan.”16 An evolutionary biologist, Joseph Popp, created a computer-
based questionnaire that helped patients determine the risk they had of 
contracting AIDS.17 A disc was sent via mail entitled “AIDS Information 
Introductory Diskette,” disguised as legitimate software on the AIDS epidemic 
to deceive recipients;18 approximately 20,000 copies were distributed to 90 
different countries.19 After inserting the disc, nothing appeared different; 
however, ninety reboots later, the ransomware within the disc-delivered 
encrypted files, compromising the user’s computer.20 Victims’ computers were 
frozen and could not be unlocked without a “licensing fee” paid to the hacker, 
which rendered most computers unusable.21 The fee had to be paid either 
through a cashier’s check or international money order.22 Fortunately, 
researchers produced “antidotes” to record all files that were locked on victims’ 
                                                          
 11 Robert Staal, International Conflict of Laws — The Protective Principle in 
Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 15 U. MIAMI L. REV. 428, 428 (1961); Mark A. 
Drumbl, Toward a Criminology of International Crime, 19 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP. RES. 263, 
264–82 (2003); Isak Ladegaard, We Know Where You Are, What You Are Doing and We 
Will Catch You: Testing Deterrence Theory in Digital Drug Markets, 58 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL., 
414, 415 (2017). 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; see also Alexandra Perloff-Giles, Transnational Cyber 
Offenses: Overcoming Jurisdictional Challenges, 43 YALE J. INTL. L. 191, 223–26 (2018) 
(“The availability of an international criminal tribunal . . . would medicated many of the 
problems of State jurisdiction . . .”). 
 13 Alan Neuhauser, Can the Law Stop Ransomware?, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 13, 2019), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2018-04-13/can-the-law-stop-
ransomware. 
 14 Maggie Miller, Lawmakers Criticize Trump’s Slashed Budget for Key Federal Cyber 
Agenda, THE HILL (Mar. 11, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/487120-
lawmakers-criticize-trumps-slashed-budget-for-key-federal-cyber-agency. 
 15 Waddell, supra note 7. 
 16 Alexandre Gazet, Comparative Analysis of Various Ransomware Virii, 6 J. COMP. 
VIROL. 77, 78 (2010). 
 17 Waddell, supra note 7. 
 18 Gazet, supra note 16. 
 19 Waddell, supra note 7. 
 20 Gazet, supra note 16. 
 21 Waddell, supra note 7. 
 22 Id. 
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computers.23 After Popp was arrested, it was discovered that the ransomware 
attack was a reaction to not being hired by the World Health Organization.24 
Popp was angry he was overlooked for a promotion and launched an attack on 
almost 100,000 people across the globe.25 Ever since, the trend of ransomware 
attacks has been on the rise, with different motives behind each attack.26 
II. WHAT IS RANSOMWARE? 
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”), an agency 
within the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), defines “ransomware” 
as a type of malicious software (“malware”) that is designed to restrict or deny 
access to computer data until a ransom, typically in the form of bitcoin, is fully 
paid by the victim(s).27 More commonly, the definition of “ransomware” is 
malware that locks an individual’s or company’s computer, or the overall 
computer system, and prevents the individual or company from accessing the 
data until the affected party pays a ransom, usually in bitcoin.28 Bitcoin is a 
method of “electronic cash” that is maintained through transactions with other 
users.29 The malware enters the computer through three distinct methods: (1) 
through phishing emails, which is an email used by scammers to trick the 
receiving party into giving up personal information;30 (2) through phishing 
emails that are sent from a company a party may know in an attempt to get the 
reader to click a link which releases the malware;31 or (3) through “infected” 
websites that humans unknowingly visit.32 Ransomware occurs in three phases: 
(1) seeking a target, (2) extortion and loss of access, and (3) ransom message 
display.33 In the first phase, attackers target documents as it is quicker and more 
efficient to access information, and they eventually gain power over his or her 
                                                          
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. (noting that ransomware today is used to target incompetent technology users 
by convincing them something is horribly with their computers that can be fixed for a small 
sum, as well as to target hospitals with advanced encryption technology for ransoms as high 
as $17,000). 
 27 Ransomware, supra note 8. 
 28 Farringer, supra note 9, at 953. 
 29 What Is Bitcoin?, BITCOIN MAG., https://bitcoinmagazine.com/guides/what-bitcoin 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2021). 
 30 How to Recognize and Avoid Phishing Scams, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www. 
consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-recognize-and-avoid-phishing-scams (last visited Mar. 4, 
2021). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Ransomware, supra note 8. 
 33 Gazet, supra note 16, at 77–78. 
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victim(s) through freezing and extorting data.34 Finally, the attacker reaches the 
ultimate goal of gaining money from the victim(s).35 
Studies have found that hackers “exploit cyber weaknesses and gain access 
into victims’ computers” to install the ransomware software remotely, then 
encrypt the files, freeze their entire computer, and demand payment in ransom 
to have the data unlocked.36 
III. WHAT ARE HOSPITAL RANSOMWARE ATTACKS? 
Ransomware attacks on hospitals are on the rise as hospitals are becoming 
uniquely vulnerable in the new digital age.37 This vulnerability stems from (1) 
glacial-slow movement toward electronic medical records; (2) the Department 
of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) lack of enforcement of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPPA”), and the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinic Health Act (“HITCH”) “with 
respect to security of electronic data;”38 and (3) the sheer necessity of paying 
hackers for electronic data.39 
First, massive computer systems are needed to transfer all medical data that 
was once recorded on paper to an electronic system, which opens a door for 
attackers to infiltrate the process of transferring data.40 Expensive machinery is 
needed to sustain these massive electronic systems, which cost the hospital 
thousands if not millions of dollars. Thus, hospital executives are wary to spend 
even more money on security.41 From stealing hospital-issued laptops or cell 
phones, to infiltrating large-scale HIPPA breaches, the sheer size of hospitals 
makes them accessible targets for attacks.42 Furthermore, human error is a 
massive risk when it comes to ransomware attacks, and hospitals employ one of 
the largest networks of employees in the working world, from doctors to nurses 
to administrative staff.43 
There is an immense financial incentive to attack hospitals because the 
                                                          
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 78. 
 36 Balsamo, supra note 10. 
 37 Farringer, supra note 9, at 940–41. 
 38 Id. at 941. 
 39 Hackers Demand $14 Million, supra note 9. 
 40 Farringer, supra note 9, at 956–57 (outlining generally the large-scale investments in 
IT security by many health institutions required to defend against ransomware attacks). 
 41 Id. at 956–57 (outlining criticisms of the current IT security practices of many 
hospitals). 
 42 See id. at 951 (noting that more recent data breaches have seen smaller breaches 
morph “into larger-scale HIPAA breaches, such as hackers infiltrating the networks of large 
health systems and insurers). 
 43 Id. at 957. 
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attacker can demand more money due to the sensitive data and functionalities 
that live within hospital computers.44 Mike Christman, a section chief for the 
cyber division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), stated that 
“cybercrooks” know that hospitals “are more likely to pay if only because they 
can’t afford not to.”45 The average digital extortion payout in 2018 was 
approximately $36,295.46 Hospitals hit with ransomware attacks face the 
dilemma of paying the attacker in an attempt to get private data back or refusing 
to pay and risk losing all data.47 Consequently, hospitals are more likely to pay 
the ransom than attempt to recover the stolen data through other software 
means.48 
The two specific types of ransomware that are used to attack hospitals are the 
“Locky virus” and “Samas virus.”49 The Locky virus begins its attack on 
hospitals through emails that are opened by unknowing individuals in the 
hospital.50 Next, the malware that has been unknowingly installed by the hospital 
employee moves through the system.51 As a result, the malware locks out all 
users until access is granted by the attackers and once they have received the 
bitcoin payment.52 On the other hand, the Samas virus attacks through 
“vulnerabilities in web servers.”53 One example of a common web server 
vulnerability is called an “SQL injection” where the attacker can gain access to 
a computer’s database and even “spoof a user’s identity,” leading to the 
destruction or alteration of data within the database.54 
IV. PREVIOUS RANSOMWARE ATTACKS ON HOSPITALS AND 
MEDICAL FACILITIES 
In September 2019, Campbell County Health in Wyoming was subject to a 
                                                          
 44 See id. at 952 (noting the primarily financial motivations of many recent ransomware 
attacks on hospitals, as personal information can be sold as “hacked” data on the black 
market). 
 45 Hackers Demand $14 Million, supra note 9. 
 46 Picchi, supra note 2. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Farringer, supra note 9, at 955. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Emily Pribanic, Web Server Vulnerabilities Attacks: How to Protect Your 
Organization, TECH FUNNEL (last updated June 29, 2020), https://www.techfunnel.com/ 
information-technology/web-server-vulnerabilities-attacks-how-to-protect-your-
organization/. 
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ransomware attack, which held all computers hostage.55 As a result, surgeries 
were cancelled, laboratories and therapies were halted, the hospital would not 
take on new patients, and local community members were forced to travel to 
other hospitals.56 Typically, smaller cities are more attractive targets for 
attackers because they lack resources to fight the attack and the money is coming 
from taxpayer dollars.57 
On October 1, 2019, DCH Health System in Alabama had to close three 
separate hospitals to new patients because they were under ransomware 
attacks.58 The hacker sent an email about the ransom information, alerting 
hospital staff of the impending attack.59 The health network’s computer systems 
were “paralyzed,” and medical staff were forced to turn away “all but the most 
critical new patients.”60As a result, ambulances were instructed to cease their 
usual activities—patrolling the streets to ensure proximity to potential health 
crises—to transfer all patients to other hospitals, thereby threatening the lives of 
patients who have to travel farther for healthcare.61 
On September 30, 2019, seven Australian hospitals responded to a “cyber 
health incident.”62 A ransomware attack blocked access to several systems, 
including their financial management networks.63 Consequently, hospital 
computer systems were locked for the first twenty-four hours after the attack.64 
Australian authorities stated that it would take weeks to secure and restore the 
damaged networks.65 
On November 17, 2019, Virtual Care Provider, a company that provides 
technology to over one hundred nursing homes in the U.S., fell victim to a 
ransomware attack.66 The hackers demanded fourteen million dollars before they 
would restore access to the company’s servers.67 The company was unable to 
pay the demand; consequently, many of the nursing homes that relied on the 
company were unable to access patient records, use the internet, order 
                                                          
 55 Picchi, supra note 2. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Dan Goodin, Ransomware Forces 3 Hospitals to Turn Away All but the Most Critical 
Patients, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 1, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/ 
2019/10/hamstrung-by-ransomware-10-hospitals-are-turning-away-some-patients/. 
 59 James Franklin, DCH Health Systems Hit by Ransomware Attack, Not Taking 
Patients, ABC 33/40 (Oct. 1, 2019), https://abc3340.com/news/local/dch-hospitals-hit-by-
ransomware-attack-not-taking-patients. 
 60 Goodin, supra note 58. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Hackers Demand $14 Million, supra note 9. 
 67 Id. 
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medication, or pay their employees.68 A day after the attack, the company 
learned that twenty percent of its services were affected and one hundred servers 
needed to be rebuilt.69 After further investigation by a local security firm, it was 
determined that Russian hackers infected the company’s computers over a 
fourteen-month timeframe using malicious email attachments.70 
A. MedStar Health Attack – March 28, 2016, Maryland 
On March 28, 2016, one of the most extensive ransomware attacks happened 
in Washington, D.C.71 Employees at MedStar Health began to see pop-up 
messages on computer screens that were seeking payment in bitcoin for hijacked 
data: $19,000 in exchange for a digital key that would release all data.72 All 
systems remained dark over a ten-day holdout period: ten hospitals and 250 
outpatient centers had to shut down all computers.73 Patients were either turned 
away or treated without proper computer records.74 
Over 30,000 employees were forced to use old paper records to treat incoming 
and current patients, which led to a dangerous patient safety issue.75 For 
example, the attack led to lab results taking much longer than usual, and it caused 
a nurse to accidentally continue a patient’s powerful antibiotic treatment for 
eight hours longer than necessary.76 Additionally, appointments were cancelled 
for non-life-threatening health issues, such as quarterly visits with kidney 
specialists and weekly radiation treatment.77 The encrypted hospital data caused 
staff and patients “to report delays in service and confusion in treatment.”78 
This attack was, unfortunately, successful because of the specific tactics 
employed by the hackers. First, the hospitals were targeted after normal business 
hours, so there were few members on hand to respond to the immediate attack.79 
Second, the hackers used European-based services to launch the attacks on the 
                                                          
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 John Woodrow Cox, MedStar Health Turns Away Patients After Likely Ransomware 
Cyberattack, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/medstar-
health-turns-away-patients-one-day-after-cyberattack-on-its-computers/2016/03/29/ 
252626ae-f5bc-11e5-a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Balsamo, supra note 10. 
 79 Id. 
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hospitals from a remote location, which would later be determined as Iran.80 
V. CONSEQUENCES OF RANSOMWARE ATTACKS 
After the MedStar ransomware attack, the FBI and US Secret Service tracked 
the hackers to Iranian computers.81 These hackers were found to have been at 
the helm of schemes targeting government agencies, small cities, and local 
businesses in the US.82 In addition to targeting MedStar Health, these hackers 
attacked the cities of Atlanta, Georgia, and Newark, New Jersey; they attacked 
the Colorado Department of Transportation, the San Ysidro Port in San Diego, 
and five other healthcare companies in the US.83 Overall, these hackers amassed 
almost $6 million, while their victims suffered more than $30 million in losses.84 
The attack encrypted data from computers of more than 200 victims.85 The 
attackers used “SamSam” ransomware,86 a form of the Samas virus,87 to attack 
each of the victims.88 The financial recovery can cost upwards of millions of 
dollars, potentially running many smaller cities and governments into 
bankruptcy.89 As a result of this vicious malware, “cyberinsurance” has been on 
the rise: an insurer will now pay the requested ransom to help limit the 
catastrophic results that stem from losing data.90 
Cyber insurance is offered to organizations that use computer systems in their 
businesses.91 This form of insurance can benefit the organization when it is 
facing a lawsuit from owners of data that has either been “lost or compromised 
by a hacker” from the organization’s computer system.92 Cyber insurance 
“covers financial losses that result from data breaches and other cyber events.”93 
When it comes to “cyber extortion,” also known as ransomware, cyber insurance 
                                                          
 80 Id. 
 81 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware 
Attack, supra note 10. 
 82 Balsamo, supra note 10. 
 83 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware 
Attack, supra note 10; Balsamo, supra note 10. 
 84 Balsamo, supra note 10. 
 85 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware 
Attack, supra note 10. 
 86 Balsamo, supra note 10. 
 87 Farringer, supra note 9, at 955. 
 88 Balsamo, supra note 10. 
 89 See Fernandez et al., supra note 10. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Marianne Bonner, What Does a Cyber Liability Policy Cover?, BALANCE SMALL BUS. 
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-s-covered-under-a-cyber-liability-
policy-462459. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
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typically extends to “any extortion payment” or expenses incurred in responding 
to the demand of the extorter.94 According to Raytheon, an aerospace and 
defense company,95 “97% of networks will experience a security compromise 
over any given six-month period;” therefore, cyber insurance is necessary to 
protect a company from vulnerability.96 The cost of cyber insurance varies based 
on the size of the company, annual revenue, and the industry, but typical 
premiums can incur an annual cost of anywhere from $650 to $120,000.97 
However, regardless of the growing cyber insurance industry, the ransomware 
business is so lucrative that hackers are putting profits made from the ransom 
into research on how to execute ransomware attacks more fluidly.98 For 
example, in May 2017, the city of Baltimore was attacked by ransomware with 
the hacker’s ultimate goal of $76,000 in bitcoin, or else the hacker would not 
release the city’s files.99 The city refused, and the resulting damage cost more 
than the original ransom: $5.3 million was spent on computers and contractors 
to recover the lost information; lost revenue and expenditures cost more than 
$18 million; and many of the city’s residents faced water bills more than three 
times the normal amount.100 
VI. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF RANSOMWARE ATTACKS 
As a result of this vicious malware, the FBI, US Secret Service,101 National 
Security Agency (“NSA”), and other intelligence bodies have become 
increasingly involved in ransomware attacks.102 Recent attackers have been both 
American-born as well as foreign nationals from Eastern Europe and Iran.103 
Craig Carpentino, the US Attorney for New Jersey, stated that not only were 
these attackers installing ransomware for money, but they were also “seeking to 
harm our institutions and our critical infrastructure.”104 
On a state level, states governments from California, Connecticut, Michigan, 
                                                          
 94 Id. 
 95 What We Do, RAYTHEON, https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities (last visited Mar. 4, 
2021). 
 96 Brand Barney, Cyber Breach Insurance: How Much Does It Cost? 
SECURITYMETRICS, https://www.securitymetrics.com/blog/cyber-breach-insurance-how-
much-does-it-cost (last visited Mar. 4, 2021). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Fernandez et al., supra note 10. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware 
Attack, supra note 10. 
 102 Fernandez et al., supra note 10. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Balsamo, supra note 10. 
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Texas, and Wyoming have introduced new laws that specifically target 
“‘ransomware’ or computer extortion.”105 For example, Connecticut has a law 
that grants prosecutors the power to apply traditional extortion charges, as 
necessary, to ransomware attacks. These can result in three years 
imprisonment.106 
The paramount example is a 2018 pending case in the US state of Georgia 
against two Iranian nationals, Faramarz Shahi Savandi and Mohammed Mehdi 
Shah Mansouri. The men deployed the attack on MedStar Health in the 
Washington, D.C., region and the attack against the city of Atlanta using the 
same “SamSam” ransomware.107 The March 2018108 attack focused on city 
computer systems and attempted to extort “tens of thousands of dollars” from 
the government of Atlanta.109 The attack lasted longer than a week, with an 
original demand of $51,000 and 3,789 computers held hostage.110 A federal 
grand jury indicted the two men in the US District Court for the Northern District 
of Georgia for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.111 
Additionally, both men were indicted by a federal grand jury in New Jersey 
for six different counts of conspiracy, fraud, and intentional damage.112 The two 
District Courts worked in coordination with one another and the Computer 
Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the United States Department of 
Justice.113 In December 2015, the two men accessed computers of victims, 
hospitals, municipalities, and public institutions, and installed “SamSam” 
ransomware to encrypt data on their computers.114 The indictment included 
victims across North America, from the cities of Atlanta and Newark to the 
University of Calgary in Alberta, Canada.115 The indictment, “the first of its 
kind,” outlined “an Iran-based international computer hacking and extortion 
scheme that engaged in 21st-century digital blackmail.”116 As promising as both 
                                                          
 105 Fernandez et al., supra note 10. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware 
Attack, supra note 10. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Romo, supra note 1. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Atlanta U.S. Attorney Charges Iranian Nationals for City of Atlanta Ransomware 
Attack, supra note 10. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Office of Public Affairs, Two Iranian Men Indicted for Deploying Ransomware to 
Extort Hospitals, Municipalities, and Public Institutions, Causing Over $30 Million in 
Losses, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-iranian-
men-indicted-deploying-ransomware-extort-hospitals-municipalities-and-public.-indicted-
deploying-ransomware-extort-hospitals-municipalities-and-public. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
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indictments may sound, legal scholars have been wary to hold out hope for 
justice against Savandi and Mansouri: the US does not have an extradition treaty 
with Iran, so a trial likely cannot be held if both defendants are hiding abroad.117 
However, these indictments are part of a larger strategy of the US government 
in an attempt to create “legally admissible cases against foreign cyber 
attackers.”118 As of right now, attackers are “unlikely to see the inside of a [US] 
courtroom.”119 
VII. TRANSNATIONAL CYBERATTACKS – RANSOMWARE 
Cyberspace is a term that is difficult to grasp; it has been deemed a space that 
“lacks geographic boundaries and does not map neatly onto the traditional 
system of territorial jurisdiction.”120 One major problem with cybercrimes is the 
issue of transnational cyber offenses and how a state may claim jurisdiction.121 
One of the most common types of transnational cyberattacks is infectious 
malware, the overarching category that encompasses ransomware.122 
With cyberattacks becoming more frequent, the government needs to adjust 
its legal system to incorporate civilian and international attackers.123 Currently, 
the FBI prosecutes computer crime and the Defense Department (“DoD”) 
prosecutes cyberwarfare.124 However, ransomware is a form of computer crime 
and, at the same time, cyberwarfare, as it seeks to extort its victims.125 Which 
internal agency prosecutes the hackers? Domestic cybercrime laws traditionally 
do not extend extraterritorially as it is viewed as a violation of other nations’ 
sovereignty.126 Which country can prosecute the hackers? American cybercrime 
enforcement, especially relating to the healthcare industry, is very limited.127 
Therefore, the government must act before taxpayers lose more money, hospitals 
shut down, operating rooms go dark, and local governments go bankrupt by 
attempting to regain data. 
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VIII. DISCUSSION 
The paramount question facing our legal system is how our government can 
get international attackers on US soil to face their day in court for the attacks 
they executed against American victims? Cyberattacks on American hospitals 
are one of the few non-violent acts that can create a fine line between life and 
death; therefore, making a legal statement to ensure hackers do not continue to 
infiltrate our healthcare system is of the utmost importance.128 I argue that the 
lack of procedural guidelines over how to prosecute ransomware hackers is 
putting American lives at risk. The US government needs to implement 
measures to specifically target international hospital hackers, or else private data 
could have the dangerous potential to go public with no way to stop it. 
Before addressing ways to manage this new form of cyberattack, it is 
necessary to understand why stopping ransomware in the American healthcare 
system is imperative on a global level. Healthcare company data is 
extraordinarily valuable. It is a highly sought-after target for attackers: “You can 
do anything with a complete electronic health record.”129 Stephen Batchelder, 
the Massachusetts Interlocal Insurance Association’s (“MIIA”) Director of 
Claims and Risk Management Operations stated, “When critical systems at 
hospitals, police and fire departments, or vital infrastructure systems such as 
water, electricity, and natural gas are attacked, public safety and individual 
welfare can be put at risk.”130 An attack on a healthcare system is ultimately an 
attack on America’s critical infrastructure.131 Researchers at Vanderbilt 
University’s Graduate School of Management analyzed an HHS list of more 
than 3,000 hospitals, about ten percent of which suffered from a data breach.132 
The study found that after data breaches, “as many as 36 additional deaths per 
10,000 heart attacks occurred annually at the hundreds of hospitals 
examined.”133 Additionally, for healthcare centers that experienced a 
ransomware attack, it took an additional 2.7 minutes for patients suffering from 
a heart attack to receive an electrocardiogram,134 a test used to detect heart 
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problems.135 Researchers from Vanderbilt also discovered that remediation 
efforts after a data breach were associated with a decline in the timeliness of care 
and patient outcomes.136 The former Deputy Chief Information Security Officer 
at HHS, Leo Scanlon, stated that “the exploitation of cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities is killing people.”137 Overall, the study found that “hospitals that 
have been hit by a data breach or ransomware attack can expect to see an increase 
in death rate among heart patients in the following months or years because of 
cybersecurity remediation efforts.”138 
A. Measures to be Implemented – International & Domestic Jurisprudence 
First and foremost, before implementing any other form of international 
jurisprudence toward healthcare ransomware prevention, the US must set forth 
a theory of protective extraterritorial jurisdiction over ransomware attacks on 
American healthcare systems. The protective theory claims jurisdiction over any 
act “predicated on the national interest injured by the offense committed 
abroad.”139 This theory, based on self-defense, was designed to protect the 
national interest of the injured country through its legal system.140 The hacking 
of healthcare systems in the US is a matter of national security, as it is the 
nucleus of American infrastructure, which houses almost every single 
American’s personal data and effects. Thus, if protective jurisdiction is ensured 
through international treaties, agreements, and statements by public officials, US 
courts would have the power to hear these cases without question.141 
1. Criminal Theory of General Deterrence 
A court system is built to ensure accountability of one’s actions: 
“accountability is cast as a prerequisite for justice.”142 The main method of 
international criminal accountability is jail time.143 Without accountability, our 
system would descend into chaos as criminals could escape without 
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repercussions: “without accountability measures, cyberspace risks becoming a 
Hobbesian state of nature in which victims engage in self-help and cyber-
vigilantism.”144 A government cannot allow victims to take accountability into 
their own hands. There must be legal measures in place to ensure the hackers 
will be brought to justice in a court of law. Currently, there are no accountability 
measures in place because the field of ransomware attacks is new and law 
enforcement officers, coupled with the judiciary, need a system in which to 
execute and enforce laws on a cyber-plane. 
One measure that could be implemented is a form of international criminal 
jurisprudence through general deterrence as to healthcare ransomware. It is a 
well-known theory that if general deterrence triumphs, “crises and wars do not 
occur.”145 General deterrence addresses the assumption that human beings act 
based on what is in their best benefit.146 Relatedly, human beings will aim to 
avoid “unpleasant consequences, such as punishment;”147 therefore, if the 
punishment becomes more severe, the hacker is less likely to break the law, 
resulting in a decreased crime rate.148 The key is “to install a sense of increased 
risk of punishment in the individual that is contemplating criminal behavior.”149 
Although there is a growing trend that harsher punishment does not lead to an 
effective cease of criminal activity,150 prevention coupled with accountability, 
in the form of general deterrence, can formulate a targeted international criminal 
justice campaign.151 
The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and 
Rwanda (“ICTR”) rationalized the punishment of crimes before these courts 
under each of the traditional justifications for punishment: retribution, 
deterrence, isolation, and rehabilitation.152 In many imperative cases, the 
tribunals impose sentences with the goal of deterrence to warn future 
international leaders that “they will be held accountable for their behavior.”153 
As stated above, ransomware in hospitals is some of the most destructive cyber-
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warfare to date. As such, it is in the interest of national security to put an end to 
it. Therefore, a strict punishment should be applied to perpetrators to deter 
copycats and likeminded individuals from attacking the data of US citizens. 
2. US Tribunals for Cybercrime 
The US government can ensure protection from international cybercrime in 
the form of hospital ransomware by the creation of a forum to hear civil cases 
stemming from cybercrime hackers.154 During a criminal trial, or even after the 
case has ended, civil cases for economic damages allow the victims to receive 
some form of compensation. In the case of healthcare ransomware, civil cases 
can come from the hospitals attacked, the patients whose data was breached, or 
the local government who had to pay for the repercussions. These forums can 
take the form of Article I courts.155 The Constitution enables Congress to create 
inferior tribunals to hear different matters.156 
Precedent has been set for independent tribunals through Dames & Moore v. 
Regan.157 In response to the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran and its 
US occupants, President Jimmy Carter used the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) to seize all Iranian property in the United 
States.158 Consequently, Dames & Moore filed suit against the Government of 
Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Iranian banks with allegations 
of money owed for services performed for the Atomic Energy Organization.159 
As a result, the district court issued orders of attachment against property of the 
co-defendants to secure a judgment.160 Iran and the US came to an agreement on 
January 19, 1981, known as the Algiers Accords, which freed all US hostages in 
exchange for the termination of all legal proceedings against Iran in US courts 
and the nullification of judgments against the foreign state.161 Dames & Moore 
filed suit against the US seeking to prevent the enforcement of the Accords, 
which nullified the claim against the Iranian co-defendants.162 
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The case went up to the Supreme Court of the United States, which upheld 
the constitutionality of the Algiers Accord and the creation of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal (“IUSCT”) in response to the Iranian hostage crisis.163 
The IUSCT only hears commercial claims generated by the crisis between US 
nationals and Iran.164 The tribunal was created through the use of IEEPA, an act 
of Congress, and the Algiers Accord, a treaty that was created by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, making the IUSCT an Article I 
court.165 
Another example of an Article I tribunal is the United States Tax Court (“Tax 
Court”).166 The Tax Court is implicated when the Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) determines there is a tax deficiency.167 Additionally, 
the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Claims 
Court”) is another example of an Article I tribunal.168 The Veterans Claims 
Court was established through the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, signed by 
President Ronald Reagan, which gave the court “exclusive jurisdiction over 
decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.”169 Both courts, like the IUSCT, 
are authorized by Article I of the Constitution to hear cases and controversies as 
designated by Congress.170 
A new cybercrime tribunal, established through Article I, would solely focus 
on civil claims from prosecutions against international hackers, thereby 
promoting a legal remedy for victims in court.171 These tribunals create a new 
avenue through which ransomware hackers can be hauled into US courts: “the 
potential for individual victims to aggregate claims and obtain significant 
damages awards could meaningfully deter would-be cyber attackers.”172 If 
patients of a hospital that suffered from a ransomware attack accumulated all 
claims into one class action against the attacker, the resulting measures could be 
so severe that future hackers would be deterred from committing similar crimes. 
The knowledge of a hacker facing not only criminal penalties of potential jail 
time, but also civil penalties amounting to millions of dollars, could potentially 
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stymie future hackers from committing the same crimes. 
For example, in the March 2016 MedStar Health ransomware attack, 
hundreds of potential patients were turned away because the computer software 
was completely frozen.173 These turned-away patients could pursue a class 
action suit against the hacker for creating the chaos that led to hospital staff 
transferring them to other hospitals. Class action suits are time and cost efficient 
for the court system; thus, they are also beneficial to the government.174 Class 
actions also have a higher likelihood of financial recovery, thereby if judgment 
is rendered against the defendant, he or she will most likely have to pay a large 
sum of money to all participants in the suit.175 Therefore, if all victims ban 
together to file a claim against their ransomware attacker, the likelihood of a 
large financial judgment rendered in their favor is even higher. This assurance 
can also create a form of deterrence for future potential hackers.176 
In the May 2017 Baltimore City attack, the local government paid over $18 
million to restore the data lost by the ransomware attack.177 From the $18 
million, $5.3 million went to contractors to help restore lost data.178 New 
domestic cybercrime tribunals, in the event of another Baltimore-type situation, 
could create an avenue in which Baltimore could seek restitution for the 
immense loss rather than leaving the crime unrectified, often resulting in higher 
taxes for residents and a loss of profits for the city as a whole.179 The idea that a 
local government could bring an international hacker to court to seek restitution 
for immense damages to the hospital, its patients, or even the city, as a whole, 
could create less chaos and fear if another attack were to happen in the future. 
Although Congressional action is needed in order to create a tribunal, the 
construction of a forum in which victims of cyberattacks can bring their 
attacker(s) to justice is one method in which the US government can pursue legal 
avenues of deterrence.180 
3. International Tribunals 
On an international level, the Security Council (Council) of the United 
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Nations (U.N.) has created several tribunals to hear specific categories of cases 
and controversies.181 Chapter V of the U.N. Charter gives the Council power.182 
This power allows the Council to establish tribunals “to bring justice to victims 
of international crimes.”183 The Council created the ICTY, a tribunal responsible 
for prosecuting people who committed gross violations of human rights in the 
former territory of Yugoslavia.184 Legal precedent for these tribunals established 
by the Council came from the trial of Duško Tadić.185 The case addressed the 
question of whether the ICTY was legitimately formed through the U.N. 
Security Council.186 The court determined that the ICTY was properly formed 
and had jurisdiction to hear all cases and controversies within the defined limits 
created by the Council.187 This determination further establishes that a 
lawmaking body has the power to create and outline the powers of tribunals. 
B. Measures to be Implemented – Adopt Cybercrime Law at Local Levels 
On a much smaller scope than a reformation of international and domestic 
legal practices, local governments must adopt laws and regulations that outlaw 
cybercrime.188 Information Security Media Group conducted a survey in 2014 
that discovered “at least one security breach that affects fewer than 500 
individuals has occurred in 75% of surveyed healthcare organizations.”189 
Additionally, “at least one incident affecting more than 500 individuals has been 
reported by 21% of surveyed healthcare providers.”190 Another study projected 
over four million ransomware variants were detected in only the first quarter of 
2015.191 Government Technology described local government cybersecurity as 
a “crisis,” with the probability of cyberattacks increasing in 2020.192 The 
practice of ransomware is increasing on a global scale, and local governments 
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must act through legal means to curb the enticing reward that ransomware can 
provide.193 
At the federal level, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act criminalize illegal online activity, however, there 
is limited state law that criminalizes ransomware.194 Almost every state has 
implemented computer crime laws and data-breach disclosure laws.195 Only 
Connecticut, Texas, Wyoming, Michigan, and California have explicitly made 
ransomware a crime.196 Wyoming law makes possession of ransomware, 
spyware, adware, keyloggers, and similar types of malware illegal.197 Michigan 
law makes it illegal only if the perpetrator possesses ransomware software and 
intends to deploy it against another.198 Both laws explicitly demonstrate that a 
state must be careful when outlining what makes ransomware illegal.199 
Additionally, if the law is defined as sheer possession of ransomware on an 
electronic device, victims would be at risk of violation as hackers infect their 
devices with ransomware: “if you get hacked, you’re going to be in some form 
of possession of [malware.]”200 
In 2018, 265 bills or resolutions affiliated with cybersecurity were considered 
by thirty-five states, along with D.C. and Puerto Rico.201 The key areas of the 
bills include: augmenting government security practices, promoting training on 
cybersecurity, and providing funding for cybersecurity programs.202 In 2019, the 
amount of states and US territories that have considered cybersecurity bills has 
increased to forty-three states and Puerto Rico.203 Close to 300 bills were 
considered among the forty-three states and Puerto Rico, with thirty-one 
enacting cybersecurity-related legislation.204 The topics are broadening to 
include: requiring agencies to train employees on security practices, creating 
task forces to combat cybercrimes, and addressing cybersecurity political 
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threats.205 
In 2016, the University of Maryland, along with the International City/County 
Management Association, conducted a nation-wide survey on local government 
cybersecurity.206 Approximately thirty-eight percent of local governments were 
found to be reliant on generationally inept technology.207 Additionally, fewer 
than half of the local governments surveyed had bought cybersecurity 
insurance.208 The FBI has repeatedly stated that a current, leading cyberthreat to 
local governments is ransomware.209 For example, Fort Worth, Texas, is subject 
to 15,000 cyberattacks daily.210 The responsibility of the cyber protection of 
constituents and local infrastructure belongs to “the entire chain of elected and 
appointed officials in local government.”211 The government cannot leave the 
duty of cybersecurity to the information technology departments of local 
businesses and hospitals. Local governments must step in and prevent future 
attacks.212 Dr. Allan R. Shark, the executive director of the Public Technology 
Institute, emphasized that local governments should outsource all information 
technology: “Recent ransomware attacks have brought to light many 
deficiencies in digital hygiene . . . [g]iven the growing complexities of planning 
and maintaining technology as well as having the right staff, many local 
governments might be much better off outsourcing some or all of their IT 
operations.”213 
Although experts have stated that local governments need to start adopting 
policy to combat cyberattacks, there are many challenges that have stymied 
efforts.214 Teri Takai, the executive director for the Center for Digital 
Government, outlined the challenges for local governments’ cybersecurity 
efforts: lack of resources, antiquated technology, introduction of new 
technology, scope of local government, lack of funding in executive roles, and 
lack of understanding of cybersecurity issues.215 
When it comes to critical state interests, such as elections, transportation, and 
intelligence, municipalities tend to collaborate with one another—sometimes 
across state lines—and with the federal government.216 Thus, the practice of 
obtaining cybersecurity policy and adopting cybersecurity legislation should fall 
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into the same critical state interest categories as elections, transportation, and 
intelligence.217 
1. Preparation is Not Key 
Many experts state that the most diligent approach to defeating ransomware 
is to prepare those who could be attacked.218 Experts believe that the best 
approach to combat ransomware attacks is through preparation: “. . . following 
best practices such as regularly backing up data, educating employees about 
threats and risks and maintaining robust firewalls.”219 However, this approach 
has not worked since ransomware’s creation in 1989; it is thirty years later and 
there has still been an increase in attacks since the original “AIDS Trojan” 
attack.220 Attacks have continued to occur across the globe with hospitals, cities, 
and states unable or unwilling to upgrade all computer systems to “seal off 
vulnerabilities.”221 Preparation can help members know what to look for,222 but 
the consequence stemming from robust prosecution is necessary to put a stop to 
the catastrophic malware attacks. 
C. Measures to be Implements – Increase Funding for Cybercrime Prevention 
CISA, the cybersecurity agency of the DHS, is dedicated to defending federal 
networks, election infrastructure, and physical security.223 For Fiscal Year 2020, 
the House Appropriations Committee approved a $63.8 billion spending 
package for the DHS, with specifically two billion earmarked for CISA.224 
CISA’s budget increased by $335 million from Fiscal Year 2019.225 
Representative Lucille Roybal Allard (D-CA) stated that the twenty-percent 
increase in funding will help CISA improve cyber and infrastructure defense 
systems faster.226 Notably, CISA gained bipartisan support for increasing its 
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budget.227 However, then-Director of CISA, Chris Krebs, requested $3.17 
billion when testifying before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Innovation for Fiscal Year 2020.228 Krebs also 
requested $371 million for proactive cyber protection, providing CISA’s 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (“NCCIC”) 
increased funding to quickly respond to incidents and risks.229 
For Fiscal Year 2021, CISA has been approved for only $1.7 billion: “a 
significant budget cut from the more than two billion the agency received from 
Congress in December 2019.”230 While testifying before the House Homeland 
Security Committee, acting Secretary of the DHS, Chad Wolf, attempted to 
mitigate the congressional dismay regarding the funding decrease by hinting that 
it is possible for the CISA budget to be further decreased in 2021 since it is not 
an election year.231 Although the CISA workforce grew by 500,232 its budget 
dwindled by $258 million.233 Representative Gary Peters (D-MI) claimed that 
state governments are not fiscally prepared to defend their constituents from 
attacks, stating: “State and local governments don’t always have the tools to 
defend against cyberattacks. Financial constraints, workforce challenges, and 
outdated equipment are all serious challenges for states and cities.”234 
Representative Cedric Richmond (D-LA) said a “cut of that magnitude” would 
harm American communities, and constituents would not be able to defend 
themselves against devastating cyberattacks.235 As recognized by members of 
Congress, cuts to CISA’s budget are detrimental to national security; all 
resources must be used to better handle emerging threats.236 
1. COVID-19 Pandemic – The Need for More Funding 
On December 31, 2019, scientists detected a new virus “in the city of Wuhan 
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in Hubei province, China”237 and subsequently reported to the World Health 
Organization (“WHO”).238 On January 30, 2020, the outbreak was declared a 
“Public Health Emergency of International Concern.”239  Subsequently, on 
February 11, 2020, WHO announced that the name of the new disease is 
COVID-19.240 COVID-19, also known as the coronavirus disease, has swept the 
entire globe, and has increased the overall demand for “medicine, vaccines, 
diagnostics, and reagents.”241 As a result of the growing pandemic, people have 
turned to the internet to stay updated, which has created a “perfect opportunity 
for hackers.”242 Malicious individuals have capitalized on the growing pandemic 
to “exploit and take advantage of the public and business[es].”243 
An Android app called “COVID19 Tracker” portrayed itself as an app 
tracking the current outbreak. However, it was actually a form of ransomware 
locking owners out of their phones.244 After the attacker locked the victim’s 
phone, the attacker required that $100 in bitcoin be paid within forty-eight hours 
in exchange for the victim to regain control of the phone and its contents.245 
Cybersecurity researchers found multiple fake COVID-19 tracker maps that can 
infect computers, in addition to the apps that can infect phones.246 
COVID-19 has created a stage for ransomware attackers to capitalize on 
growing fear sweeping the globe.247 In the beginning of March, healthcare 
systems have been targeted by a new and dangerous Windows ransomware 
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threat.248 The threat is called “NetWalker,” and it is used by cybercrime groups 
that have created phishing attacks against the healthcare sector during the early 
stages of COVID-19.249 NetWalker lures its targets in with an email about 
COVID-19,250 then attacks by locking down the computer or specific 
websites.251 The Champaign Urbana Public Health District (“CHUPD”) in 
Illinois, which covers 210,000 citizens and the University of Illinois, was 
attacked by NetWalker in early March 2020.252 The malware attacked CHUPD’s 
primary website, and forced the district to set up an alternate website to keep 
citizens updated about the growing COVID-19 pandemic.253 
Additionally, ransomware attackers have targeted systems abroad, such as 
Hammersmith Medicines Research, a London-based company that conducts 
medicinal clinical trials.254 While the company was in talks about testing a 
potential COVID-19 vaccine, hackers locked thousands of patient records and 
threatened to publish the information if a ransom was not paid.255 André Pienaar, 
founder of venture capital firm C5 Capital, stated that cybersecurity companies 
have seen “a number of instances where clinical labs involved in testing, or 
major hospitals, have suffered ransomware attacks, where all their IT systems 
have been knocked down.”256 Ransomware attackers have been attempting to 
seek profits from the global crisis, and the ramifications could be devastating.257 
Malcolm Taylor, head of cybersecurity at ITC Secure, said, “the attackers 
know that these organizations are so desperate at the moment to build 
ventilators, or to stop people from getting sick, and they are trying to exploit 
that.”258 Furthermore, organizations have turned to a remote workforce, creating 
an opportunity for ransomware attackers to target gateway and virtual private 
network appliances.259 Now more than ever, cybersecurity officials have 
recommended that hospitals regularly update their technology services, 
strengthen protocols in response to breaches, and engage with security 
                                                          
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Shaun Nichols, Fresh Virus Misery for Illinois, THE REGISTER (Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/03/12/ransomware_illinois_health/. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Ryan Gallagher & Bloomberg, Hackers ‘Without Conscience’ Demand Ransom from 
Dozens of Hospitals and Labs Working on Coronavirus, FORTUNE (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://fortune.com/2020/04/01/hackers-ransomware-hospitals-labs-coronavirus/. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Samuel Haig, Microsoft Helps Hospitals Fight Ransomware Amid Coronavirus 
Pandemic, COINTELEGRAPH (Apr. 7, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/microsoft-helps-
hospitals-fight-ransomware-amid-coronavirus-pandemic. 
202 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 29.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
professionals on a more regular basis.260 
In response to the growing cyberthreat, CISA issued an alert that 
organizations keep all technology systems up to date and remain transparent 
with employees about the dangers of ransomware.261 Since January 2020, more 
than 4,000 coronavirus-themed web domains have emerged. Cyber group Check 
Point estimates that “5 percent [of the web domains] were suspicious and 3 
percent were malicious.”262 The repeated message from CISA to all 
organizations is to ensure all employees are educated about the potential threats 
that may appear as a result of the pandemic.263 Cyber experts have stated that 
although USTelecom has pledged to protect against network vulnerabilities, it is 
imperative that Congress provides greater funding to CISA and to the 
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.264 
IX. CONCLUSION 
There is more that can be done in response to ransomware in the US. A 
response to the growing threat must be through jurisprudential, political, and 
financial means. The number of ever-increasing attacks can be impeded through 
criminal deterrence,265 US cybercriminal tribunals,266 a local government focus 
on cybercrime,267 and an increase in federal funding for CISA.268 To keep the 
US and its citizens safe, the federal government, in conjunction with state 
legislatures, must put its full force behind cybersecurity management. 
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